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Abstract
The long period of stability in the EMS was followed by crises and realignments 
which reestablished the exchange rate equilibria. We introduce dynamics into a target zone 
system with divergences in the fundamentals to explain this outcome. We set up a model with 
heterogeneous beliefs which stresses the existence of an implicit conflict in a target zone 
system with divergent fundamentals and show that a nominal target zone while divergences 
in the fundamentals persist conveys a self-defeating mechanism: it may allow deviations from 
the equilibrium exchange rate in the short-run, but it is an unsustainable objective in the long- 
run, because the band cannot attain perfect reputation. Only if  the target zone becomes 
instrument of convergence this fateful outcome may be avoided and IT represents the case 
for a successful target zone.
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The crisis and collapse of the European Monetary System (EMS) 
after years of exchange rate stability, gives rise to obvious doubts regarding 
the suitability of the current structure of the system to move the European 
Union towards Monetary Union.
After the Basel-Nyborg Agreements the EMS survived for more than 
five years without realignments. This long period of relative calm in a 
context of greater financial integration has been referred to as the ’new 
EMS’ by Giavazzi & Spaventa (1990). However, the survival of ERM’s 
target zone while fundamentals were diverging generated large implicit 
misalignments in the exchange rate. The apparent currency stability in this 
period went hand in hand with the accumulation of deeper tensions and 
when these tensions eventually came to light, a series of exchange rate 
crises and multiple realignments followed which reestablished some sort of 
exchange rate equilibrium.
The main goal of this paper is to show that fixing the nominal 
exchange rate within a band while divergences in the fundamentals persist 
may allow deviatons from the equilibrium exchange rate in the short-run 
(the so-called honeymoon effect), but it is an unsustainable objective in the 
long-run. The performance of the ’new EMS’ and its ultimate collapse 
would fit this interpretation.
The existing models of target zones can explain the first part of the 
story. Their main insight is that when the target zone regime is credible, 
economic fundamentals between two countries are able to diverge more for 
a given exchange rate than in a floating regime due to the effect on 
expectations of the existence of an institutional band limiting exchange rate 
fluctuations. Although there have been attempts to build target zone models 
which explain why a target zone loses credibility and eventually collapses 



























































































& Garber (1991)), they are unable to endogenously generate exchange rate 
collapses. One reason is that the time dimension is not apparent, given the 
structure of the basic target zone model. Furthermore, the rational 
expectation hypothesis (REH) which underlies the solution, while being 
essential to obtaining a closed form solution, strongly constrains the 
relationship between the exchange rate and the fundamentals, limiting the 
role of such dynamics.
We overcome these difficulties by developing in section II a model 
with heterogeneous beliefs; each belief is based on a different assumed 
model determining exchange rates. This implies departing from the 
expectation formation mechanism implicit in the standard models. 
Nevertheless, there is still a representative agent who solves an 
optimization problem, such that rational behaviour is preserved; he is 
simply faced with two different beliefs from which to make up his 
expectation. This specification stresses the existence of an implicit conflict 
in a target zone system with diverging fundamentals. After obtaining some 
insights from a mathematical analysis of the model in section III, this setup 
allows us to generate exchange rate trajectories (section IV), incorporating 
a time dimension in the target zone regime. We examine the characteristics 
of these trajectories, which depend on the degree of divergence between the 
economies. The observed stability of the ’new EMS’ while the 
fundamentals between member countries continued to diverge can then be 
explained; we will refer to this feature of our model as the dynamic 
honeymoon effect since it evolves over time. Although the target zone may 
endure periods of strain (attacks), the zone necessarily collapses, given the 
growing exchange rate misalignments. In the next section (V), we show 
that this outcome can be interpreted in terms of reputation and credibility; 
this perspective also highlights the reasons for the empirical failure of 
target zone models. Finally, section VI extends the model to admit the 
possibility of inflation convergence which would illustrate the case of a 




























































































system. Section VII sums up the conclusions.
II-A TARGET ZONE SYSTEM WITH TWO TYPES OF AGENTS
It has long been recognized that structural models incorporating 
rational expectations have failed to explain the evolution of exchange rates 
after the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system. This failure has generated 
a series of studies on how expectations are actually formed in the market 
and it has opened a vast field of theoretical research in which the strongest 
assumptions of the REH have been abandoned1.
Agents in financial markets form their expectations under uncertainty 
and presumably do their best in a rational way to produce forecasts. For 
instance, Kurz (1991) stresses that agents may exhibit drastic differences 
in beliefs even when they share the same information; this does not imply 
at all that they are inefficient, but that after efficiently processing the 
information, different agents draw different conclusions, according to their 
rational beliefs. Kurz concludes that "scientific knowledge is limited and 
many different theories are compatible with the behaviour of the data. The 
existence of wide gaps in the knowledge of the agents about the economy 
results in a speculative search, which forms conjectures, hypotheses or 
theories and these are the main source of heterogeneity of beliefs".
This heterogeneity of beliefs can be captured informally by a model 
in which the market expectation is the result of aggregating the private 
beliefs of individuals agents. Individual agents form their expectations 
conditionally on their information set and according to different structural
'-See, for instance, Frankel & Froot (1987,1988), Allen & Taylor (1989), Goodhart 
(1991).This departure is always hazardous since, quoting Goldberg & Frydman (1993), "the 
great appeal of the Rational Expectations paradigm is that ... the implied expectations of the 
agents have superior theoretical properties in terms of unbiasedness and consistency...and any 
attempt at moving away from the RE framework immediately implies the presence o f some 




























































































models, not just THE model or view of the world implied by the REH . 
The information of the agents basically consists of the observed past data 
and of their knowledge about the evolving environment. Notice that none 
of the models which agents have in mind necessarily corresponds with the 
’true’ model by which the exchange rate process evolves naturally. 
Actually, since the effective exchange rate is influenced by market 
expectations, it will be driven by the dominant model in which the market 
believes, regardless of whether it makes economic sense or not.
2.1-Fundamental and institutional beliefs
The existence of heterogeneous beliefs naturally arises in target zones 
regimes since it is implicit the co-existence of two different well- 
established models for the determination of the exchange rate. On the one 
hand, there is the assumption that the exchange rate has to return to its 
equilibrium level determined by macroeconomic fundamentals. On the 
other hand, when a institutional exchange rate arrangement is established - 
in our case, a target-zone system such as the EMS- there exists a 
commitment adopted by the authorities to keep to the arrangement and this 
commitment to defend the parities influences the expectations of the 
agents. Each model generates a different type of belief, which we refer to 
as fundamental or institutional beliefs, respectively. The market expectation 
will simply be an aggregate of both beliefs’ so that one of the crucial 
questions to settle is how this aggregation is determined. First of all, we 
describe the forecast which each type of belief generates.
Fundamental beliefs (F). the core hypothesis of any structural model 
is the assumption that the exchange rate will ultimately be consistent with 
the level of fundamentals so that the equilibrium exchange rate (s) fulfills 
some specific fundamental equilibrium relationship, such as Purchasing 




























































































exchange rate, s, is expected to return to the equilibrium s, at an 
adjustment speed determined by the parameter p:
Fr A,vJ+1-p (£ [J rilJ-sr) (])
The superscript (in this case F) denotes the expected exchange rate 
change on the basis of the corresponding type of belief; the corresponding 
subscript refers to expectation at time t regarding t+1. When the current 
exchange rate is lower than the equilibrium exchange rate, it is expected 
to depreciate and viceversa.
Institutional beliefs (/) on the other hand, are determined by the 
existence of a fully credible target zone. As Krugman (1991) or Froot & 
Obstfeld (1991) show, the commitment of the authorities to intervene just 
at the margins of fluctuation to defend the band influences exchange rate 
expectations throughout their whole range of fluctuation.
This result is formally obtained by solving a standard monetary 
model with rational expectations for the exchange rate, in which the 
fundamentals (s) follow a Brownian motion process which is regulated at 
the margin when a target zone is set up. The solution to this model is of 
the following form:
s= s+ Q (s,s ,s) (2)
where s+ s_ are the upper and lower limits of fluctuation, respectively.The 
non-linear component of the solution (Q) is obtained from solving a second 
order differential equation The non-linearity implies a wedge between the 
evolution of the fundamentals, or in our case s, and the exchange rate, 
which delivers the so-called honeymoon effect. Figure 1 displays the results 
of solving this model in which the exchange rate, conditional on a free 
float regime, follows a brownian motion with a drift equal to 1% and a 
standard deviation equal to 5%. We can observe that the model establishes 




























































































right box), but also between the position of the exchange rate in the band 
and the expected exchange rate changes (lower left graph), where the size 
of the honeymoon effect-or non linear term- can be identified.
We are especially interested in the characteristics of this second 
mapping, since it determines exchange rate expectations conditional to the 
existence of the target zone, that is, it determines the institutional beliefs 
(/) . Writing the exchange rate in terms of deviations from the central 
parity (s’=s-c), this second mapping has the following properties:
Vs <s'<s =» Q*,<0+ S
(3)
where Q' is a non-linear function derived from Q. The closer the exchange 
rate is to the upper limit-s+ (lower limit-s), the larger the appreciation 
(depreciation) that is expected; at the limits of fluctuation the curve is 
tangent to the band and expectations are determined by a non-linear 
function of the position of the exchange rate within the band (see lower left 
graph in figure 1).
It is important to note that the magnitude of the honeymoon effect is 
basically determined by the width of the band and the drift in the 
fundamentals, with no explicit consideration of time and, in this sense, the 
honeymoon effect is static. We will see below that on the contrary our 
model allows the projection of the honeymoon effect through time.
2.2-Market expectations
Given the two models which potentially enter in any individual 
agents beliefs, the market aggregates private beliefs to form the aggregate 
expectation. We assume that the market is composed by an arbitrarily large 
number of agents (i-l,2,...,n), whose individual expectations (As\t+I) are 




























































































and the institutional (f,) beliefs with weights equal to w‘„l-w‘r respectively. 
It is further assumed that the expectations derived from the two types of 
beliefs are homogeneous across agents (F,=Ft; I,=fp for all i), but each 
agent is assumed to assign a different weight to each belief, so that 
individual beliefs are heterogeneous. The market aggregate expectation is 
then simply the weighted average of the fundamental and institutional 
beliefs:
a< +i- w 'f ,+(i - wt')i- w - i e : i  w>
0 zw ' ^1
(4)
We can then think of the market as a representative agent which 
forms its own forecast as a linear combination of the forecasts generated 
by two different models or beliefs. This sort of specification is similar to 
that in Frankel & Froot (1988) in which each type of belief represents a 
type of agent in the market. The market aims at maximizing the yield of 
its investment in foreign exchange and in doing so it attempts to formulate 
the most accurate forecast, conditional to its knowledge of the economy 
(conveyed by the two models) and the information contained in the data.
Since the error variance of any linear combination of forecasts is 
lower than the variance of any individual forecast, the combined forecast 
of the models improves upon any single forecast. Consequently, the market 
will find it optimal to use a linear combination of forecasts (see Granger 
& Newbold (1986)), such as appears in (4). Therefore the problem of the 
market becomes one of choosing the optimal linear combination of 
forecasts, by selecting the weight wt which minimizes the one-step ahead 
forecast errors (§,M). Subtracting (4) from the effective exchange rate 





























































































?r= A s^i-A s",; i f -A s ^ -F ,;  | r A s M-/,;
It is immediate to show that the market one-step-ahead forecast 
errors are minimized by obtaining the Least Square estimator of w from the 
regression:
where (5)
which is equal to (4), but for the consideration of the effective exchange 
rate changes instead of the market forecast. The type of least squares to 
estimate depends however on the consideration of the past by the market. 
This is arbitrary up to certain extent. Nonetheless, Allen & Taylor (1989) 
reveal that in the foreign exchange market recent past influences more the 
current forecast than more distant periods. Thus, we will consider that the 
memory of the market is short and most recent observations carry more 
weight in the determination of the past so that the updated weight is 




The estimator has been expressed in recursive form for latter 
convenience. The term G, is the recursive gain (see Harvey (1981),ch.7). 
The parameter X is the discounting factor; the lower X, the more weight is 
carried by the most recent past and the faster expectations are updated 
(X.=l, in the ordinary least squares case). Thus, the optimal rule is simply 




























































































forecast errors. The model which has performed better in the recent past 
will gain weight in the current period forecast and viceversa.
Finally, as we indicated above, structural knowledge of the economy 
is incomplete and the market ignores the ’true’ process governing the 
exchange rate, which we approximate in discrete time by:
This can be seen as a random walk with a drift which depends 
linearly on market expectations (we go into greater detail on the 
interpretation of the parameter 0 below). This disparity between the ’true’ 
process and the interpretation of the realizations of the process by the 
market provides the driving force for the model dynamics.
2.3-Divergence and conflicting expectations
Let us assume that the equilibrium exchange rate (s) follows a 
random walk (that is the discrete time version of a Brownian motion) with 
drift p, such that in each period it diverges from the central parity at an 
expected rate equal to p:
Recalling that the equilibrium exchange rate is given by PPP and 
denoting domestic and foreign prices by p  and p \  respectively, where 
’foreign’ can be interpreted as an average of the member countries of the 
zone, it follows immediately that the drift in the equilibrium exchange rate 
































































































Therefore, we can treat the drift of the process for the equilibrium 
exchange rate, fi, as a measure of divergence between the economies.
Figure 2 compares the expectations generated by both models in a 
target zone with a 12% fluctuation band. The unit period adopted is the 
month, so that the plot displays monthly expectations; the exchange rate is 
expressed in (log) deviations from the central parity, which is set equal to 
one (hence, its log is equal to zero). Assuming that the equilibrium 
exchange rate is set equal to the central parity (s=c=0), both types of 
belief predict that the currency depreciates when it is in the lower part of 
the band and that it appreciates in the upper part of the band.
What happens as fundamentals drift away from the central parity?. 
If we assume a positive drift, the expectation derived from the fundamental 
beliefs shifts upwards by a magnitude equal to the drift each period, as we 
can see by looking at the slashed lines in the figure 2. On the contrary, the 
answer is in principle ambiguous for the case of institutional beliefs, 
because they can be seen to be based either on the evolution of 
fundamentals or on the position of the exchange rate in the band; these two 
mappings are consistent in the static setting represented in figure 1. 
However, if the fundamental belief contributes to drive the exchange rate 
(w>0), the mappings become inconsistent, because the position of the 
exchange rate in the band will not correspond with the current level of 
fundamentals2. We assumme then that, when forming their institutional 
belief, agents take into account the position of the exchange rate in the 
band, which is immediately observable and the level of fundamentals is 
only used to form their fundamental belief: if the exchange rate 
qualitatively behaves within the band as the institutional belief implies, it
2
-The parameters which determine the solution to the institutionalist belief underlying 
model could be updated in order to reconcile both mappings. However, the dynamics o f the 
model may be such that long deviations o f the equilibrium exchange rate correspond to 





























































































is reasonable to think that the expectation will be maintained, so that 
insititutional beliefs are static with respect to the position of the exchange 
rate within the band, as figure 2 displays. This is consistent with the EMS 
experience, where the band was expected to be maintained despite the large 
divergence in the fundamentals.
This being the case, the fundamental belief will eventually forecast 
a further depreciation of the currency even when it reaches the limit of 
depreciation, while the institutional belief forecasts an appreciation of the 
currency. Consequently, the expectations following from the different 
beliefs are not only heterogeneous, but also eventually conflicting; hence, 
one of the models must predict incorrectly. The potential for conflict 
cannot be ultimately avoided given the establishment of a target zone 
among economies with diverging fundamentals, as the EMS.
Even if the EMS parities approximately corresponded to their 
equilibrium exchange rate at the time they were determined, exchange rate 
equilibrium deviated from the central parity over time. Furthermore, the 
EMS has shown recurrent periods of calm which have been invariably 
followed by exchange rate crisis and realignments. In the light of our 
model, these patterns of behaviour can be interpreted as a story of 
underlying conflict between the two types of beliefs, where one or another 
belief has dominated the market at any particular moment: the endurance 
of EMS parities for years while fundamentals were still diverging can be 
thought of as periods when the institutional belief dominated the market, 
whereas the turbulent periods preceding the realignments of intrinsically 
weak currencies represent episodes when the market followed the 
fundamental belief. This is clearly a very simple interpretation for the 
evolution of the EMS, particularly when we recall the series of shocks 
which have led to the 1992-93 EMS crisis. These issues will be explored 




























































































2.3-The signalling effect o f interventions
When a target zone is established for an exchange rate, there is a 
presumed commitment to defend the band. The effect of interventions on 
market expectations raises the issue of the sustainability of the exchange 
rate commitment. We assume that the authorities only intervene at the 
edges of the band and that these interventions are infinitesimal3. Let s' be 
the exchange rate for the next period if no intervention takes place, and x 
the period when an intervention is necessary. Then, when the exchange rate 
is driven outside the (upper) band (s+<s*x=.sx./+0AsMx_;x+vx), a sale of 
reserves (R) will take place to keep the exchange rate at the edge of the 
band (sz=s J .  For simplicity, we will assume that AR=-(s*-sJ <0. The 
effectiveness of this intervention can be considered from three perspectives: 
fundamental beliefs, institutional beliefs and the overall market expectation.
Fundamental beliefs: expressions (1) and (9) imply that interventions 
can affect the fundamental belief, if they are not sterilized; the monetary 
contraction derived from a loss of reserves could affect the price level and 
would consequently push down the equilibrium exchange rate, reducing the 
depreciation expectation arising from the fundamental belief and hence 
easing the pressure on the currency. Despite the appeal of introducing a 
more formal intervention-sterilization framework into the model, we will 
assume in this paper that interventions are sterilized in order to preserve its 
simplicity and to emphasize the role of expectations. This being the case, 
the authorities only intervene when it is necessary (marginal interventions) 
and rely completely on the signalling effect of interventions to manage the 
exchange rate within the band, so that fundamental beliefs are not affected.
Institutional beliefs already account for the expectation that the
3-This is the assumption underlying the target zone model which determines 
institutionalist beliefs. It is straightforward to introduce intramarginal interventions (see Froot 





























































































authorities will intervene at the edge of the band when producing the 
forecasts. Therefore, the signalling effect of interventions is automatically 
incorporated into the target zone model and it generates the characteristic 
non-linear relationship displayed in Figure 1. Since by definition, 
institutional beliefs always attach perfect credibility to the band, effective 
interventions do not affect their expectations, either.
Market expectations are on the contrary conceivably affected by 
interventions and we have to devise a method so as to incorporate them 
into the model. Interventions may send two signals of opposite sign to the 
market: on the one hand, when the band is put under strain and is 
successfully defended, it is reasonable to think that the authorities will gain 
credibility (positive signal); on the other hand, interventions erode the stock 
of reserves of the Central Bank and the ability of the authorities to defend 
the band in successive periods of pressure. Furthermore, the recurrence of 
interventions may alert the market to the future viability of the zone and 
consequently about its eventual sustainability; both factors send negative 
signals to the market.
Thus, the question to settle is which type of belief will gain 
dominance when an intervention takes place. In other words, how 
interventions affect the dynamics of w„ given that a net negative signal will 
presumably be reflected in a larger weight of the fundamental belief in the 
market, and viceversa. We can observe that, according to the updating 
mechanism of the model in (6), the effective exchange rate AsT=s+-sT_, 
should be used in the next period’s estimation of the weights. This would 
imply taking fully into account the positive signal derived from 
intervention. At the other extreme, if the intervention had been dismissed 
by the market, an adjustment would be made as if no intervention had been 
carried out: As’T=s'-sx_,. The signalling effect of interventions is then 
easily incorporated into the model taking these two options as extreme 
cases, and modifying the exchange rate change which effectively enters 




























































































A s ;' - Ast- y tA/?t =(s. -st ,)+yx(s; -s ,) (10)
where Osys/ is an increasing function of the number of interventions: 
y=#AR-l/#AR+l. It is immediately seen that the highest positive signal is 
thus obtained with the first intervention, and it decreases thereafter; in the 
limit, the market will update as if there would have been no intervention 
at all. This mechanism conveys the intuition that the negative influence 
given by the drain of reserves eventually offsets the positive signal derived 
from a successful defence of the band.
III-MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS
The aim of the model outlined is to explore the dynamics of the 
exchange rate in a target zone system, where the interaction between 
different and eventually conflicting beliefs in the market determines the 
evolution of the exchange rate. This section explores, as far as possible, the 
characteristics and restrictions of our model from a mathematical point of 
view and the next section relies on a simulation analysis to overcome the 
limitations of the mathematical approach.
Some restrictions are necessary to obtain explicit results from the 
mathematical analysis. In particular, we restrict the range of exchange rate 
fluctuation to explore to the upper part of the band (s>c) and to overvalued 
exchange rates (s > s)4. These are not strong assumptions: on the one 
hand, for positive drifts, below the central parity fundamentalists drag the 
exchange rate towards the upper band, whereas institutional beliefs pull it 
towards the central parity, so that both forces are upwards and the
We also assumme in what follows that e=0, i.e. the process for the fundamentals is 
deterministic and, unless otherwise stated, that v=0 too. Finally, 1(0)=0 < fi which is only the 
case when the process assummed for the fundamentalist is driftless. These assumptions do not 





























































































exchange rate is expected to remain in the upper part of the band; on the 
other hand, if the exchange rate depreciates above its equilibrium level, 
both beliefs expect an appreciation. With these conditions, it follows that, 
for all t, F,>0,I,<=0 -* Xt>0,Gt>0.
The model can be expressed as a system of four difference equations, 
governing the market expectation su, the weight attributed to fundamental 
beliefs, w, the equilibrium exchange rate s and the effective exchange rate, 
s. The latter equation is redundant and the dynamics of s are exogenous; 
therefore after solving for /  in equation (4) and substituting terms in (6), 
this can be seen as a system of two difference equations with a forced 
motion conveyed in (8). Only in the cases in which interventions are 
necessary, the mechanism which appears in equation (10) substitutes the 
effective exchange rate change. We can then write:
A s u . r w f t+ ( l - n t) I t (4 )
G , [ ( e - l ) A s " 1+ v , ] ,  V s < s t
A  Wv+1 1 C , [ ( s + - s M ) +  Y ( S '  - s ,_  -  v
(6 ' )
i ) + v , ] ] ,  V s , - s +
A s  , - u  + er.r-fl r '  1 (8 ' )
From (6’) we can see that, for the system to have endogenous 
dynamics, i.e: dynamics which do not depend on the stochastic terms, it is 
necessary that 0 is different from one. The parameter 0 can be interpreted 
as follows; there exists a group of agents which do not contemplate any 
particular model, but follows the mood of the market, represented by the 
market expectation (and consequently does not participate in forming such 
expectation). This group acts then as positive feedback noise traders or 
imitators who make the actual exchange rate overshoot or undershoot 
market forecasts. The magnitude of such noise trading is unknown by the 
market when forming expectations and this gap of knowledge is crucial in 





























































































We can then think of the model as a system of recursive difference 
equations in which changes in the exchange rate imply changes in the same 
direction in the weights (intuitively, when the exchange rate depreciates, 
the fundamental belief gain weight, because the institutional belief is 
predicting worse). However, the contrary does not necessarily hold, see 
equation (13) below. This ’asymmetry’, along with the forced motion 
component, generates the complex dynamics of the model. Nevertheless, 
several issues which delineate the dynamic behaviour of the model can be 
explored. First we study the stability of the solutions, then we obtain a 
sufficient condition for the collapse of the zone and finally some indicative 
results on the dynamics are worked out.
3.1-Solutions and stability
The recursive structure of the model implies that stationary points for 
5 (S) are also stationary points for w (W). We can concentrate on the 
solution for the weights. From (4’):
W-w( t-w(-  - I[s,] (11)
The value of this solution depends basically on two factors: non- 
linearly on the position of the exchange rate in the band and on the 
equilibrium exchange value, which is in turn a function of time. The 
complexity of the system makes it infeasible to find a general closed form 
solution. Nonetheless, since the values of the weights are bounded between 
zero and one an important question to investigate is whether the process 
will converge to those points and, in this case, whether these are stable 
solutions. It follows immediately that W -0  (-+S=c=0) and W=1 (—>S=s) do 




























































































planes displayed in figure 2. The critical question is whether these solutions 
are stable. Taking the total differential to the expression above, where 
ds/dt=n; dt/dt=l; ds/dt=v, (note that disturbances are now being 
considered), we obtain:




Let us now evaluate the sign of these derivatives at the solutions
?K\ = -A -^ -v  • Vv >0 >0
d T w'° pfit *  ' dT w’°
dlT| . p , N w dW. n---- \ -A -fl-fu -v  ,);Vv >fi =>-----L .>0.
d T w’' /[s] ' ' d T w '
Therefore, when there is a positive disturbance at W=0 the system 
will follow an unstable trajectory, since the increase in w will provoke an 
exchange rate depreciation (if s>s) and this will translate in a further 
increase in w, and so on. The inverse process occurs for W=1 when the 
disturbance is larger than the drift in the fundamentals.
Relaxing the assumptions used in this analysis (i.e. no disturbances 
in the equilibrium exchange rate, no drift implied in institutional belief) 
adds complexity to the above expressions but does not change the 
conclusion, which is that the system is potentially unstable at the extreme 
market beliefs.
3.2-Sustainability of the target zone and collapse condition
The second issue to explore is the potential for collapse of the target 




























































































collapse of the band is provoked by the persistence of market expectations 
which drive the exchange rate beyond its limit of fluctuation. The trigger 
for this depends on the behaviour of the system at the edges of the band. 
Let us retake the previous discussion on intervention and assume again that 
the exchange rate increases and eventually the edge of the target zone band 
is breached at some time t, so that a Central Bank intervention is necessary 
to defend the band. From (4), next period’s change in the market 
expectation is:
AsTJ,T*1-A st . 1.^ A Wtit+1|F t -A 5 jK w tA f „ +1+( l - Wt)A/I>ttl; <13>
This expression has no definite sign. When it is negative the 
exchange rate returns to the band with no further intervention. However, 
when this expression is positive, a second consecutive intervention 
will be necessary to keep the exchange rate at the edge of the band. Since 
AFx+I =‘0,AIx+l=0 and Ix+I=I[sJ, updating (13) for the period of the second 
intervention simplifies to:
A s“ i.t*2-A s“ +i + Awt+lit+2{Ft+1- /I s J | (14)
The sign of this expression only depends on the change in the weight 
(the rest of the terms are positive). Consequently, a sufficient condition for 
(14) to be positive is that Awt+;T+2aO. The sign is determined from (6” ): 
while the gain G is positive, the term in brackets may be negative. Ignoring 
the stochastic term, and taking into account that sx+l- s +, this term 
simplifies to (y-l/Q)(s'-sj so that a necessary and sufficient condition for 
a positive increase in the weight in the period is that 1/Q<yx+I< l.
When that is the case the market will expect further depreciations. 
More importantly, since y is an increasing function of the number of 
interventions, the above condition for increasing weights verifies thereafter 




























































































band to be defended. Given the dynamics of the system, these new 
interventions drain stock of reserves but are unable to reverse the 
expectations of the market. At this point, the band will be perceived not 
to be sustainable and institutional beliefs will swiftly be abandoned, 
precipitating the realignment.
This sufficient condition for collapse may seem quite complicated, 
but actually we can restate it in a practical rule: for l/Q<yT+1<l and 
positive misalignments (s-s >0) the target zone will collapse when two 
consecutive interventions are necessary, i.e. when the exchange rate does 
not re-enter the band after one intervention5.
3.3 -Fixed points
Up to this point we have shown that the system is potentially 
unstable and under certain circumstances, it may collapse. In this sub­
section we aim at getting some understanding on the complex dynamics of 
the model by exploring the characteristic of the fixed points and dynamic 
mappings of the exchange rate (s) and weight (w).
Figure 3.a,b maps the current value on the future value of 5 and w, 
respectively, obtained from expressions (4,6). Each line represents the 
corresponding mapping for given values of w and s respectively. This 
analysis is merely indicative and we have made several simplifications, 
such as keeping the gain and the equilibrium exchange rate fixed (5 -10%  
larger than the upper limit of fluctuation) and dismissing the effect of 
interventions on the mapping. The intersection of the lines with the 45° line
5-This proposition restricts the parameters o f the model, especially the way that the 
market considers interventions (the parameter y), but it is important to bear in mind that the 
band may collapse even if this condition is not fulfilled, due, in practical terms to the 
exhaustion of reserves. However, this would imply considering explicitly the stock of 
reserves; although it would be an interesting extension, it would add complexity to the 





























































































represents a fixed or equilibrium point of the mapping. Observe that the 
different equilibrium points are stable for the mapping (s„sl+1) , although 
for high values of w the equilibria are beyond the target zone. On the 
contrary, the equilibrium points are unstable for the mapping (w, ,wt+I).
This is a partial picture of the system dynamics, since it lacks the 
link between both parts. As a matter of fact, the evolution of the system 
makes the mapping switch between curves, so that the actual mapping is 
obtained by joining points between different lines. We use this intuition to 
draw a non-collapse (NC) and a collapse (C) trajectory in the (w„wt+l) 
mapping which highlights the sort of dynamics expected in the model and 
sums up the results obtained in this section. In principle, the non collapse 
trajectory differs from the collapse path only in the magnitude of the 
perturbation, vc>vNC, but the difference in the outcome is dramatic. In the 
latter case, the exchange rate reaches the upper limit above the 45° line and 
this generates an intervention spiral which causes the band to collapse.
The analysis carried out in this section has provided useful insights 
on the workings of the model, but it is constrained by the complexity of 
this non-linear dynamic system. The chaotic feature above suggests that the 
outcomes are dependent on the magnitude and distribution of the shocks. 
We turn then to a simulation analysis, in which exchange rate trajectories 
are generated in order to fully investigate the characteristics of the model.
IV-THE DYNAMIC HONEYMOON EFFECT
The formal evaluation of the model does not show how the 
honeymoon effect is projected in time. By simulating exchange rate 
trajectories, we intend to characterize the evolving divergence between 
exchange rate and fundamentals. We will also be able to demonstrate that 
the conflict derived from the co-existence of a target-zone and an 




























































































eventual collapse of the zone. Since this conflict arises from the existence 
of divergences in the process driving the equilibrium exchange rate, the 
drift parameter p  becomes essential and we will analyze the outcome for 
different drifts in the equilibrium exchange rate process.
4.1-Exchange rate trajectories
We intend to generate exchange rate trajectories that have similar 
characteristics to the recent EMS experience: a pattern of quiet and 
turbulent periods, periodic interventions by the authorities and 
realignments. These features depend on the values assigned to the 
parameters, so they will be chosen accordingly. In the previous section, 
some restrictions on the parameters were suggested; furthermore, in the 
choice of parameters, we have applied other principles. First, the white 
noise terms (v, c) are chosen to have a low variance, such that they do not 
dominate the drift in the fundamentals and they introduce low ’a priori' 
volatility in the exchange rate; secondly, the weights and the exchange rate 
should be allowed to vary widely in time, so as to generate the required 
features mentioned at the beginning of this paragraph6.
The initial setting is the following: a 12% fluctuation band with 
respect to the exchange rate central parity c is established between two 
countries. The central parity is set equal to the equilibrium exchange rate 
at the starting period (t=0). We also assume that the exchange rate then 
fulfills its initial equilibrium condition (s0- c - s 0=l). Finally, the market is 
assumed to initially maintain fundamental beliefs (w0- l ) .  A positive drift
6-Given these considerations, we have chosen as benchmark parameters for the 
simulation:
a=0.05fi; a =0.005; p=0.5 0=20; X=0.8 





























































































is asummed, in other words, inflation rates have not yet converged among 
the countries, inducing an upward trajectory in the equilibrium exchange 
rate process. We take one month as unit of time so that all plots refer to 
monthly observations.
With these initial conditions and for the chosen parameters, exchange 
rate trajectories can be generated from the model, which can be seen as a 
data generation process (DGP). We will first consider a particular draw 
from this DGP to explain how the model works and then we will replicate 
the process one thousand times in order to infer more robust conclusions.
Figure 4.a displays a realization of the exchange rate trajectory, 
where the equilibrium exchange rate (s) is driven by a drift equal to 1% 
per year. Although the equilibrium exchange rate eventually exceeds the 
upper band, the target zone lasts much longer before it collapses (162 
instead of 75 periods). We can see that periods of calm and turbulence 
alternate in the exchange rate, while the misalignment (s-s) tends to widen. 
This trajectory can be explained by Fig 4.b. The solid line represents the 
relative weight given to fundamental beliefs by the market (w; the 
institutional weight is 1-w); the slashed line and the asterisks display the 
evolution of fundamentalist and institutional beliefs, respectively. The 
relative weight assigned to each type of belief by the market evolves in 
time. When the market ’goes institutional' the exchange rate remains close 
to the central parity, but it can be seen that there are periods in which the 
fundamental beliefs gain strength in the market and the exchange rate 
depreciates.
The magnitude of such depreciation is determined by equation (4). 
Nevertheless, there is a remarkable feature in figure 4: the relative weight 
of fundamental beliefs tends to decrease, but in spite of it, the exchange 
rate jumps to its fluctuation limit with small increases in w. The resolution 
to this apparent paradox is the size of the misalignment (s - s). On the one 
hand, as the misalignment increases, market expectations have decreasing 




























































































fundamental beliefs depart from the actual exchange rate evolution, they 
tend to lose appeal in the market; on the other hand, large misalignments 
imply that small increases in the weight given to the fundamental beliefs 
can cause a large exchange rate depreciations. We will return to this point 
in the next section.
Actually, the conflict and interaction between both types of 
expectations is the critical aspect of the model. Further insight into the 
conflicting beliefs underlying this outcome can be obtained from Figures 
4.c and 4.d, which display the expectations for both types of beliefs derived 
from the model with respect to the position of the exchange rate in the 
band. As pointed out above, while the institutional beliefs lead to an 
expectation which is constant relative to the position of the exchange rate 
in the band (Fig. 4.d), the phase plane diagram of the fundamental beliefs 
show the divergence in time (the line in 4.c follows an upwards spiral 
trajectory). Once the equilibrium exchange rate has exceeded the upper 
limit of fluctuation, the exchange rate may be driven above the band and 
an intervention is necessary7. The target zone finally collapses (when our 
collapse condition is fulfilled), and the exchange rate equilibrium is 
reestablished in the form of a realignment (s -c ).
Preliminarily, the main implication of the model can be advanced: 
despite the underlying potential for collapse, the realignment only takes 
place long time after the equilibrium exchange rate surpasses the upper 
band. Hence, the zone allows a wide divergence between the level of 
fundamentals (embedded in s) and the effective exchange rate which is 
reflected in the exchange rate misalignment. This divergence can be seen 
as a dynamic variant of the honeymoon effect stressed in the target zone 
literature. It has two different dimensions, since it can be measured both
7-We define attacks as episodes of strain for the band in which interventions are 
necessary; each attack may last several periods. In the drawing shown in the graphs, no attack 




























































































in magnitude by the size of the misalignment and duration by the time 
interval between the equilibrium exchange rate surpassing the band and the 
realignment.
2.2-Degree of divergence and collapse o f the band
The timing of the collapse, given the rest of parameters, essentially 
depends on the magnitude of the drift. Furthermore, we have intuitively 
shown above that slightly different disturbances may lead to completely 
different outcomes. The working of the model has been explained with the 
help of one particular realization of the DGP, whose results cannot be 
readily generalized. To draw more robust conclusions, one thousand draws 
have been made from the DGP (D=1000) for a wide range of drifts (0.2 
% < p, s5%). Figure 5 and Table I summarize the results of these 
simulations. Plots in Figure 5 display the period of collapse histograms, for 
selected drifts. In the first place, it is remarkable that the distributions are 
not normal and become increasingly skewed to the left, suggesting again 
the chaotic nature of the model. Looking at the table we can see that both 
for the first intervention distribution (i.e. when the exchange rate reaches 
for the first time the upper limit of the band) and for the collapse 
distribution, the statistical tests reject the hypothesis of symmetry and 
normality for the distributions. We can also identify the existence of 
several peaks in the distributions, and some of them are bimodal. In these 
latter cases, the reason is the existence of one or more sustained attacks, 
which spread out the distribution and generate the possibility of large 
outliers on the right of the distributions; these outliers imply that, when the 
target zone resists more than one or two attacks, the collapse time is 
postponed considerably in time (see range for the collapse time in the 
table). Looking at the table, we can also observe that the mean of number 
of attacks sustained is lower than one and the mode is zero for all the 




























































































These are general results derived from the simulations. Further 
inference regarding the effect of different drifts have to be made within the 
appropiate framework for hypothesis testing. The resulting non-normal 
distributions prevents us from using the central moments for inference. 
Actually, although the mean of the distributions is very close to the median 
(see table), the standard deviation can be misleading. Instead, having the 
empirical distributions, gives us the chance to make inference directly on 
them8.
Figure 6.a shows the mean, median and fifth quantile of the collapse 
time distribution. Figure 6,b gives us an equivalent picture, but relative to 
the ’a priori’ collapse time (denoted by APCT) defined as the period in 
which the equilibrium exchange rate is expected to break through the band 
(APCT^-sJp). This value appears in the first entry of the table. In the 
former figure, we can see that the collapse time period decreases with the 
size of the drift, as expected. From the table, we can also see that the first 
intervention and the mean for the number of attacks follow the same 
pattern. Figure 6,b tells us about the spell of the honeymoon effect, defined 
as the ratio between the corresponding values of the simulations 
(median,fifth and tenth quantiles) and the respective APCT^. It suggests that 
the length of the period tends to decrease with higher drifts. The hypothesis 
of a significative spell in the honeymoon phase is also shown in the graphs 
(see footnote 8): the spell turns out to be significant for all the drifts, but 
for fi=4.7%,5%., at a 90% significance level, and for drifts smaller than 
4,5% for a significance level of 95%.
What about the magnitude of the dynamic honeymoon effect?. Given 
the process for the equilibrium exchange rate and the stochastic terms, we
8-For any null hypothesis to test, it will be rejected at, for instance, 95% significance 
level, if the 95% o f the distribution does not comply with the hypothesis. Hence, the null 
hypothesis in Figure 6, H0:'a priori’ collapse time -  effective collapse time , is tested by 
obtaining the fifth quantile o f the collapse distribution. If that value is higher than the ’a 




























































































can derive a direct link between spell and magnitude, such that the 
previous inference is also valid for the magnitude9. The difference 
between this equilibrium exchange rate at the time of collapse and the 
upper part of the band measures the magnitude of the effect. The median 
values of the magnitude of the honeymoon effect appear in the last column 
of the table, where we can see that it decreases with the size of the drift.
V-PESO PROBLEMS, CREDIBILITY AND REPUTATION
Up to this point, we have just described the numerical results of the 
model. The outcome could shed some additional light on the reasons for 
the empirical failure of target zone models. Figure 7 shows the scatterplot 
of the effective exchange rate changes with respect to the position of the 
exchange rate in the band for the draw appearing in Figure 4. This sort of 
relationship (using interest rate differentials to approximate the exchange 
rate changes) has been widely used in the literature (see, for instance, 
Flood et al. (1991)) to test (and reject) the basic target-zone hypothesis. 
Looking at the graph, we would have difficulties not to reject the target 
zone hypothesis, since the co-existence of two models interacting in the 
foreign exchange market disturb the basic target-zone relationship.
Let us imagine, for instance, an analyst attempting to test the target 
zone model on a data sample generated by our model, where a realignment 
has not yet occurred. Let us recall that the institutional beliefs rest upon the 
assumption of a perfectly credible target zone. Since the curve representing 
institutional expectations has a negative slope, the simplest way to test the 
hypothesis of a credible target zone formally, albeit dismissing non- 
linearities, would be to estimate the regression Asu+,=a+bs’,+u, and to test
q
-Substituting in the above expression the effective collapse time for APCTu and solving 





























































































for b having a negative sign .This test, performed on our simulated data for 
li-\%  rejected the hypothesis the 61% of the replications. The analyst 
would then explore the reasons for this rejection; following the literature 
(Svensson (1991), Bertola & Svensson (1993), Lindberg & Soderlin (1991), 
etc), he would probably point out that there exists a realignment risk 
implied in the expectations.
This realignment risk comes about because of the existence of two 
different (and conflicting) perceptions which break the theoretical relation 
derived from either one of the models. This result can be explained in a 
peso problem framework (See Lizondo (1983)). Indeed, equation (4) is 
equivalent to a peso problem specification, where two regimes are possible: 
(a) that the system prevails or (b) that a realignment comes about. To each 
of these events the market assigns a probability (7-w,w , respectively). If 
during the period under study there has been no realignment (that is, the 
event has not occurred) but that possibility affects expectations (and 
forward exchange rates) in the form of a realignment risk, the data will 
show anomalies with respect to the target zone hypothesis, and this 
hypothesis could be rejected. More precisely, the realignment risk is given 
by the divergences between market expectations and institutional beliefs 
: =w,(Ft-Il)=wrXr
Underlying the peso problem there is a problem of imperfect 
credibility of the target zone. The above expression has also been used by 
Cukierman & Metzler (1986) in a different context to define the average 
credibility (AC=AsMl̂t+I-Il) of monetary announcements. The smaller AC, 
the higher the credibility of the announcement. The monetary 
announcement in our context is the target zone, so that exchange rate 
expectations in a perfectly credible target zone should follow the 
institutional beliefs. This only happens in the periods when institutional 
beliefs dominate the market (w-0) and the average credibility is zero.
Figure 8 shows w and AC. The plot suggests that the model 




























































































zone. At this point, it is important to distinguish between credibility and 
reputation (see Weber (1990)). Reputation can be seen as a stock variable 
which conveys the accumulated knowledge or history about the system, and 
it interacts with the credibility of the system which evolves as a flow. We 
want now to describe this feedback in our model.
The parameter driving the credibility of the model is the weight w, 
and its dynamics are determined by equation (6’). There appears the gain 
G, which contains information about the past performance of the model, in 
particular on the expectations generated by both beliefs in the past (Xk-F k- 
lk = l,. . . ,t- l) .  Consequently, there may exist a link between the gain and 
the reputation of the system. Indeed. On the one hand, the gain is a 
positive term which determines the loss of credibility induced by exchange 
rate shocks; the larger the gain, the larger loss of credibility in the face of 
a shock, since d&w/dv=G(Q-l)>0 —* AC>0. On the other hand, if we take 
the derivative of the gain with respect to the exchange rate misalignment, 
we can show that the gain decreases with with the size of the 
misalignment:
_ 5 G _ t P ( X 2 - ^ ) <0
<5(7-5) (AS < A2)2 (15)
A' 1 kx \  < X 2
From both results, it follows that the marginal credibility loss is 
reduced with the size of the gain. Now we have the elements to define a 
measure of reputation. We observed in the simulations that the model 
generates widening realignments; the fact that the target zone survives with 
widening realignments should strengthen the reputation of the system and 
this is reflected in lower marginal credibility losses, as the analytical result 
shows. Hence we can define the inverse of the gain G'\ as a measure of 




























































































observable measure of a high reputation10. The feedback between 
credibility and reputation can be observed in Figure 8 by noting that the 
increases in w are inversely relationed to the degree of reputation (G 1,). 
The opposite feedback can also be identified in the plot: losses in 
credibility erode the reputation of the system, because larger values of w 
are associated with narrowing misalignments, which, in turn, increase the 
value of the gain.
Several points are important to stress. Firstly, the concepts of 
credibility and reputation just presented are defined with respect to the 
relative performance of both models, such that the credibility and 
reputation of the target zone (with respect to the fundamental beliefs) will 
be high as long as the expectations are conflicting. Secondly, perfect 
reputation (G,=0) is not feasible and consequently the danger of collapse 
is always present even in systems with high reputation; this means that, in 
the presence of large misalignments, the exchange rate may be driven 
outside the band, because losses in credibility, albeit small, are always 
possible. Finally, the results above showed that the magnitude and spell of 
the dynamic honeymoon effect tend to decrease with larger drifts; the 
reason is that large drifts make the equilibrium exchange rate diverge more 
rapidly, preventing the cumulation of enough reputation to postpone further 
the collapse time.
All in all, the exchange rate misalignment is the decisive factor for 
the collapse of the zone even if the system enjoys high reputation. This 
highlights the existence of a perverse self-defeating mechanism built in a 
target zone between divergent economies: the exchange rate misalignment
l0-This inverse relation between reputation and the value of the gain is equivalent to the 
interpretation given in Basar & Salmon (1989), where our concepts correspond ther to 
information-credibility and Kalman gain, respectively. Furthermore, deriving the gain with 
respect to the discounting parameter dGldk<0, we obtain a positive relationship between 





























































































that the target zone permits becomes the ultimate cause for the collapse of 
the system. Only if the target zone becomes an instrument of convergence 
may this fateful outcome be avoided. We now consider this possibility.
VI-ENDOGENOUS DRIFT
Given the pessimistic conclusion regarding the fate of target zone 
systems when persistent divergences exist in the economies, one could 
reasonably wonder what are the advantages of joining a target zone regime. 
In the first place, one of the main appeals of a target-zone system for high 
inflation countries is to attain convergence in the rates of inflation with the 
core low inflation countries of the zone. In this section, we briefly consider 
the deflationary effect exerted by an overvalued currency through the trade 
balance, but the effect of the target zone on inflation expectations is 
dismissed. This latter channel has been strongly stressed by the literature, 
but there is little empirical evidence that it has actually existed in the EMS 
(see Giavazzi & Pagano (1988) on the theory and Gros & Thygesen (1992) 
for a summary on the empirical evidence).
Let us express the domestic price index as a weighted average of 
national (pn) and foreign prices (p*)\ p= hpn+(l-h)p*, where h is the 
relative contribution of national goods to the domestic price index, such 
that (1-h) approximates the share of imports in GDP. If we assume that the 
national component of the price index adjusts for previous inflation (thus 
dismissing the effect of the target zone on inflation expectations), we can 
see that positive misalignments exert a deflationary bias on prices. 
Rearranging terms and substituting the equilibrium exchange rate into the 
equation we can write:




























































































which is appended to the original model. It is important to notice that an 
eventual collapse would wipe out all the inflation convergence; this can be 
checked by integrating the above expression, noting that after the 
realignment s-s returns to zero. In any case, for a given misalignment, the 
higher the share of imports, the larger the deflationary effect of the 
exchange rate overvaluation, through the reduction in the drift. This result 
affects the dynamics of the model.
Figure 9 displays one draw from the (modified) DGP for different 
values of import shares and an initial 1% drift, and Table II presents a 
summary of the results from 1000 draws. The drift decreases, as expected, 
due to the overvaluation which the target zone grants and this reduction 
bends down the trajectory of the fundamentals ( fig 9 also displays the path 
of the fundamentals with fixed and endogenous drift) and postpones the 
collapse time. Table II displays the minimum values which the drift 
achieves for different import shares. We can observe that for values of (1-h 
) large enough (>8%), the drift may become negative; negative drifts can 
even be attained within the band, for values higher that 14%u. This raises 
the possibility of non-collapse of the target zone. To sum up, we can 
distinguish three different outcomes: (i) positive drifts-collapse, (ii) 
negative drifts-collapse and (iii) negative drifts-non collapse.
The first case is verified for low import shares (l-h<8%) and the 
final outcome is simply a postponement of the realignment, as Figure 9,a 
shows. Case (ii) holds in general for the range [8%,20%]\ for the lower 
values of this range, the negative drift is achieved outside the band, and the 
equilibrium exchange rate does not return to the band, so that it finally 
collapses. For values larger or equal than 14%, the negative drift is 
achieved within the band, but subsequently it turns positive again (due to
11-This latter result can be formally obtained from the integral o f (16). The maximum 
misalignment possible within the band, is s-s=st -c=s+. Therefore, solving for the import 





























































































a narrowing in the misalignment) and s breaks through the band, provoking 
the final collapse. Finally, for parameters larger or equal than 18%, the 
varying drift usually keeps the equilibrium exchange rate within the band, 
granting its sustainability, as can be seen from Figure 9,d. When the import 
share is around 20%, two different outcomes have been obtained and that 
is why this value is included both in (ii) and (iii). We can observe in the 
table that in 82% of the draws the band collapses, as is the case in Figure 
9,b.; on the contrary in the remaining 18%, the band is sustained. The 
reason, as fig. 9.c. shows, is that after surpassing the band, s eventually 
returns to it and stays.
In the table a sort of trade-off can be observed between the dynamic 
honeymoon effect and the share of imports: the former narrows as the 
import share increases (also notice that it is negative for the non-collapse 
cases, which represent the value around which the equilibrium exchange 
rate stabilizes). This somehow striking result can be explained from the 
reputation process. Once the equilibrium exchange rate bends down, 
expectations based on fundamental beliefs expectations become less 
inaccurate and reputation builds up more slowly; as a consequence small 
shocks to the exchange rate may have large effects on the credibility of the 
band and drive the exchange rate out of the band, provoking the collapse.
In any case, we can observe that joining a target zone can be 
beneficial for relatively integrated countries, when the inflation differentials 
converge and keep the equilibrium exchange rate within the band (case iii). 
This conclusion has been reached, dismissing the effect of the target zone 
on inflation expectations; its consideration would presumably further 
strengthen the case for a successful target zone.
VII-CONCLUSIONS
This paper has presented a model which makes explicit the 




























































































seems to have been neglected by policy makers, who instead enjoyed the 
vision of a golden path to Monetary Union.
The ’new EMS’ developed a high reputation during the last years, in 
the face of the large misalignments of the high-inflation currencies. The 
existing parities were credible because the market tended to hold an 
institutional view which was self-sustaining and avoided tensions. When 
diverse shocks hit the system, its credibility and the reputational gains were 
eroded and the market judged that the parities were unsustainable, 
provoking the speculative attacks that followed.
The model is designed to reproduce these features of the EMS. The 
main conclusion is that a target zone can indeed last for a long time despite 
divergences in the fundamentals (i.e. a dynamic honeymoon effect) and 
even endure attacks against the parities, thanks to the accumulated 
reputation. However, this undeniable short run success is eventually 
confronted with the existence of large fundamental exchange rate 
misalignments, which are generated by the target zone itself. This internal 
inconsistency characterizes the outcome: a honeymoon effect which 
vanishes abruptly. We have actually highlighted the existence of a 
continuous clash between backward looking expectations, which feed the 
credibility of the zone, and forward looking expectations which foresee the 
return of the exchange rate to its equilibrium level. This conflict can only 
be avoided or postponed if a link between both is allowed; this was done 
by considering the possibility of an endogenous drift, which may deliver 
convergence and prompt the case for an ultimately successful target zone.
All in all, this paper should be contemplated as a contribution to the 
current debate on the future of the European Monetary System. It 
subscribes to the view that a rigid target zone regime in a world of 
integrated financial markets faces important problems in the presence of 
divergences in the economies; although the system can deliver stability for 
a long time and even contribute to the convergence of the economies, 




























































































eventual collapse of the target zone. This work is intended to highlight this 
perverse mechanism built into the EMS structure which eventually renders 
the system unstable.
In our opinion, the direct implication of this intrinsic instability is the 
need for a reform of the system, which renders it more in line with the 
behaviour of the fundamentals and, as a consequence, more stable. Even 
in the case when divergences are being reduced, the suitability of a 
realignment should be recognized . The introduction of more flexibility into 
the system, either in the current framework or through a reform of the 
system, may allow an everlasting honeymoon which culminates with the 
birth of a common currency.
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Fig 2- Exchange rate expectations: Fundamentalists and institutionalists.
Fundamentalists have linear expectations but, if there exists divergence in the fundamentals, their 
expectations are not constant with respect to the position of the exchange rate in the band. Institutionalists 
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Fig 4.a,b -Exchange rate trajectories simulated by the model. The upper graphs display the trajectories 
of the equilibrium (s) and effective (s) exchange rates. The lower graph presents the evolution of 
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Fig 6.a-Collapse time for different drifts. The fifth quantile represents the 95% significance level
MAGNITUDE OF THE HONEYMOON EFFECT
Fig 6.b -The figure shows the ratio between the respective statistics of the collapse distribution and the 




























































































EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE VARIATIONS
Fig 7-Position in the band and exchange rate variations for a particular realization of the process
CREDIBILITY AND REPUTATION OF THE TARGET ZONE
Fig I  The figure shows the ratio between the respective statistics of the collapse distribution and the 
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EXCHANGE RATE PATH; Im p o rt shore  =  5%
EXCHANGE RATE PATH; Im p o rt shore =  20%




























































































EXCHANGE RATE PATH; Im po rt shore =  20%
EXCHANGE RATE PATH; Im port shore =  30%
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